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Teaching Assistance
January 01, 2021Posts
datasets
Dados Transparentes
June 08, 2020The website Dados Transparentes collects data from the State’s Health Secretaries and the Ministry of Health about covid deaths and cases. The data was collected using the Scrapy framework and is available in CSV format in the Github repository.
B3 Dados
September 21, 2020Scraped data from the Brazilian Stock Exchange (B3) website for Financial Statements, Material Facts, Reports and other important information about B3 listed companies. The data was collected using the Scrapy framework and is available in CSV format in the Github repository.
Planos de Governo
August 31, 2022Análise dos planos de governo dos candidatos a presidência nas eleicões brasileiras de 2022. Os arquivos foram coletados do website de cada candidato e analisados com a biblioteca textract.
Resultats Election
February 02, 2023Dataset on all Belgium elections since 1840’s up to the district level available on the Le Service public fédéral Intérieur website. The data was collected using the Selenium framework and is available in CSV format in the Github repository.
jmp
External and Internal Markets for Managers
Job Market Paper, 2024 [paper] [slides]
Abstract: This paper studies the labor market for managers by examining both between and within firm reallocation channels. I document that around 40% of the inflows into managerial positions come from internal promotions, a flow comparable in size to the job-to-job transitions into the same roles. I develop a labor search model with internal reallocation and on-the-job learning. External flows depend on how firms are currently internally organized. Internal flows depend on the extent of skill accumulation of workers under managers and on external hiring and separation events. Using administrative data from Germany, I document that managers receive a substantial wage premium and play a key role in the skill development of workers within the establishment. The model matches observed external and internal flows into managerial positions and provides insights into how these channels operate across the talent distribution. Lastly, I evaluate policy implications of targeted Non-Compete Agreements, finding that restrictions on managers lead to fast-tracked promotions and reduced output, whereas non-competes on workers enhance skill accumulation and increase productivity.
portfolio
publications
Opaqueness and Liquidity in Over-the-Counter Markets
Gabriel Toledo, Fernando Lopes, Ângelo Mendes, Working Paper, 2024 [paper] [slides]
Abstract: We develop a model of search in OTC markets with asymmetric information and trade occurring under double-sided uncertainty over asset quality, where holding the asset does not necessarily translate into knowing its quality. This leads to deterioration of market information conditions over subsequent trades, causing both sellers and buyers to become more pessimistic even though aggregate asset quality remains unchanged. If re-trade opportunities are frequent, information in the economy becomes coarser, hindering market liquidity and volume of trade.
talks
teaching
Teaching Assistant
Teaching Assistant, New York University, 2021
Courses that I served as a Teaching Assistant since I joined NYU.
workingprog
Manager Allocation and Firm Size
Working Paper, 2024 [slides]
Abstract: Managerial talent influences firm growth and expansion, yet larger firms may have an advantage in mitigating managerial turnover by sourcing replacements internally. This paper examines the relationship between manager allocation and firm size. Using German administrative data, I document that internal promotions account for 40% of managerial inflows, disproportionately concentrated in larger firms. Event study regressions show that external managerial hires are associated with firm growth, while internal promotions have a more muted effect on size. To rationalize these findings, I develop a firm dynamics model with frictional search for managerial positions, where firms optimally choose their size while accounting for manager turnover. The model shows that reliance on internal or external hires depends critically on firm size, influencing both talent distribution and firm productivity.
Firm Structure and Internal Market Power
Gabriel Toledo, Fernando Lopes, Working Paper, 2025
Abstract: This paper explores how firm organizational structure influences internal market power and wage dispersion across firms occupational layers. In complex firms, talent is distributed across multiple layers, from lower-level workers whose effective productivity primarily depends on their individual skills, to top-level managers whose productivity significantly impacts the entire firm. Recognizing this, firms may optimally choose wage structures featuring higher compensation at upper layers, reflecting managers' broader influence on overall productivity, while potentially imposing markdowns on lower-level positions. By explicitly modeling these internal firm structures, we analyze how such mechanisms shape within-firm wage inequality, internal allocation of talent, and overall productivity. Additionally, the framework sheds light on how internal reallocation interacts with external labor market pressures.